The publication of transaction data, such as market basket data, medical records, and query logs, serves the public benefit. Mining such data allows for the derivation of association rules that connect certain items to others with measurable confidence. Still, this type of data analysis poses a privacy threat; an adversary having partial information on a person's behavior may confidently associate that person to an item deemed to be sensitive. Ideally, an anonymization of such data should lead to an inference-proof version that prevents the association of individuals to sensitive items, while otherwise allowing for truthful associations to be derived. Original approaches to this problem were based on value perturbation, damaging data integrity. Recently, value generalization has been proposed as an alternative; still, approaches based on it have assumed either that all items are equally sensitive, or that some are sensitive and can be known to an adversary only by association, while others are non-sensitive and can be known directly. Yet in reality there is a distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive items, but an adversary may possess information on any of them. Most critically, no antecedent method aims at a clear inference-proof privacy guarantee. In this paper, we propose -uncertainty, the first, to our knowledge, privacy concept that inherently safeguards against sensitive associations without constraining the nature of an adversary's knowledge and without falsifying data. The problem of achieving -uncertainty with low information loss is challenging because it is natural. A trivial solution is to suppress all sensitive items. We develop more sophisticated schemes. In a broad experimental study, we show that the problem is solved non-trivially by a technique that combines generalization and suppression, which also achieves favorable results compared to a baseline perturbation-based scheme.
INTRODUCTION
We consider a data set of set-valued or transaction data. Each entry in is a set of items (itemset) { 1, . . . , } -purchased goods, query terms, or individual preferences, chosen from a universe ℐ. * Work supported by Singapore's MOE AcRF grants T12-0702-P02 and T1 251RES0807.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Articles from this volume were presented at The 36th International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, September [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 2010 , Singapore. Such data are instrumental in data mining applications, e.g., association rule mining [2, 3] , query expansion [7] , and predicting user behavior [1] ; still, their publication poses privacy threats. A particular threat is posed by an adversary who has partial knowledge about a certain person's transaction , and may use it, along with the published data, to derive additional knowledge about the contents of , thus identifying previously unknown sensitive items in . For example, a publicly released record of a bookstore's transactions reveals that people who bought a book titled "Romeo and Juliet" in the last month also bought a book titled "Free Alaska". Alice meets Bob reading "Romeo and Juliet", and learns that he bought it during the last month. Thus, she makes an inference that compromises Bob's privacy concerning his political persuasions.
Past research has examined the problem of transforming transaction data in a way that renders them proof against privacy threats. However, it never formulated the problem in a natural way that corresponds to a real-world setting. Realistically, we have to prevent against the determination of a sensitive item in a person's transaction, while preserving the utility of the data for mining other associations. Still, works providing the state of the art in the area [12, 30, 23, 14] fail to formulate the problem in this natural manner.
In particular, [12, 30] assume an a priori distinction between sensitive (private) and non-sensitive (public) items, postulating that all private items are always unknown to adversaries. Thus, sensitive items are disengaged from the transaction item set. However, in practice an attacker may possess partial knowledge of some of the sensitive items in a transaction. The methods of [12, 30] do not prevent such attackers from gaining extra sensitive knowledge.
On the other hand, [23, 14] move in the opposite direction, overcorrecting the drawback of [12, 30] . They consider all items in the universe of discourse to be equally sensitive. Thus, the distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive information is lost, even though it forms the main motivation for studying the problem in the first place. Besides, the distinction between what is sensitive and what is not also depends on individual preferences [29] , which are not considered by [23, 14] either. After all, [23, 14] are inspired from the -anonymity model for microdata anonymization [19] , so they share its conceptual shortcomings: they do not effectively protect against the disclosure of a sensitive item. For example, assume that shoppers have bought a dairy product, a detergent, some chocolate, and a pregnancy test-kit. A valid anonymization of shopping transaction data by the methods of [23, 14] could create an "anonymized" group out of these transactions; this grouping still allows an adversary to infer that a neighbor who bought milk, dishwasher, and Belgian chocolate is considering being pregnant.
In this paper, we propose -uncertainty, a novel, intuitive, and realistic model for transaction anonymization. To our knowledge, this is the first model that is tailored against the inference of sen-sitive information by an adversary, does not impose artificial constraints on the nature of that adversary's knowledge, and neither falsifies the data nor separates sensitive items from the transactions they belong to. A -uncertain transaction set does not allow an attacker knowing any subset of a transaction ∈ to infer a sensitive item ∈ with confidence higher than . Thus, -uncertainty ensures that the confidence of any sensitive association rule (SAR) is at most . Despite its semantic simplicity, the problem posed by -uncertainty is particularly challenging compared to those posed by other anonymization models. We have to disassociate all sensitive items from any piece of information that they may be associated with, including both non-sensitive and other sensitive items. A trivial solution is to suppress all sensitive items. We look for alternatives that sacrifice less information.
Our contributions in relation to prior work [12, 23, 30, 14] are summarized as follows. We introduce -uncertainty, a comprehensible, natural model that inherently protects against sensitive item inference. Contrary to [23, 14] , we distinguish between public (non-sensitive) and private (sensitive) items; still, in a departure from [12, 30] , we treat them as belonging to the same universe, and allow that an adversary may know some of the private items in a transaction. A private item already known to an adversary can function as a (quasi-)identifier for the association with another, unknown sensitive item. We define the problem in natural terms like no previous work does. We avoid reasoning that emanates from -anonymity, wherein transactions are grouped together without offering protection against sensitive item disclosure per se. Last, while the most recent previous methods are based either on generalization [23, 14] or suppression [30] , we employ both. We first develop a scheme that attempts to suppress a minimal amount of items; we use this as a building-block of a mixed scheme that selectively suppresses and generalizes items. We do not consider perturbation, so that no fake or distorted items are involved and no false associations are derived; we do not disengage sensitive items from the transactions they belong to, as in [12] . Our experiments show that the problem is solved non-trivially by our mixed approach.
RELATED WORK
A series of works has addressed the question of mining association rules [2] in a manner that preserves privacy. However, such works employ anonymization techniques based on perturbation [8, 21, 10, 18, 24, 4] , thus damaging data integrity (i.e., use distorted and fake values) and generating false inferences [27] , while they do not inherently disallow sensitive inferences. On the other hand, anonymization based on global generalization and suppression preserves the correctness of data and only compromises their minuteness; anonymized data are less specific, but not false.
To the best of our knowledge, no prior work applies generalization to prevent the mining of sensitive associations from transaction itemsets. Some recent works [30, 12, 23, 25, 14] address related problems, but do not arrive at a proper application of generalization for the explicit protection of sensitive information.
To our knowledge, [12] is the first work to anonymize transaction data without perturbation. Still, [12] assumes that adversaries can only know of non-sensitive items. For each group of transactions, [12] publishes the exact public items together with a summary of the frequencies of sensitive items in the group, so that it is not clear to which transaction therein a sensitive item belongs, as in [28] . Unfortunately, this method also impedes non-privacy-threatening mining involving sensitive items. Besides, its transparency renders it more vulnerable. For example, assume Timothy knows that (i) corn flakes were only bought together with Noam Chomsky's "Interventions", and that (ii) Theresa bought face lotion and chocolate.
A transaction set published as in [12] may indicate that face lotion and chocolate were bought together in a single transaction, which also includes corn flakes. Therefore, there exists an association of face lotion and chocolate to "Interventions". Timothy did not know about this association in advance, but he can now confidently infer that Theresa bought that classified 1 book. A method that effectively hides all sensitive associations would protect the privacy of Theresa's transaction by publishing it less transparently.
The model of (ℎ, , )-coherence [30] requires that any combination of non-sensitive items is contained in (none or) at least transactions, with at most ℎ% thereof sharing the same sensitive item. Still, [30] applies only suppression; it assumes an a priori distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive items, like [12] ; and postulates that an adversary can know at most (non-sensitive) items in a transaction. Yet an adversary may know of more than items in a transaction, including some sensitive item(s).
Two recent works [23, 14] employ generalization as a data transformation tool; [23] imposes constraints on an adversary's knowledge, but [14] does not. Still, these works do not distinguish between sensitive and non-sensitive information. They assume that all items are equally likely to be sensitive; this assumption does not conform to the real world. Even if we accepted this assumption as true, [23, 14] are ineffective in the task they set out to accomplish. Their declared objective is to prevent the inference of potentially sensitive information, assuming that the "sensitivity potential" is uniformly distributed among items. This objective is not achieved. What they do achieve is to hide a vulnerable transaction in a crowd of others. As [17] has shown, such crowds do not effectively prevent sensitive inferences: if a group of transactions already contain identical sensitive content, then [23, 14] can still group them together without concealing this content [17] .
Recently, [25] suggested a relational privacy model that distinguishes between sensitive and non-sensitive information only at the value level. The extensibility of this model to transaction data is not considered. Besides, [25] assumes, as [30, 12] do, that only nonsensitive information is observable by an adversary, and that generalizing a sensitive value to a non-sensitive hierarchy level conceals its sensitivity. Yet such a generalization reveals that sensitivity is hidden behind it. For example, the act of generalizing AIDS to virus suggests that a sensitive value exists behind the generalized one. An akin argument is made by [26] in another context.
MODELING
This section presents our privacy concept and information loss metric, which form the two sides of the tradeoff we have to resolve.
Privacy Concept
Let be a set of transaction or set-valued data. Every entry ∈ is a subset of items drawn from a universe ℐ that is divided in two subsets: a set of sensitive items ℐ , and a set of non-sensitive 2 ones ℐ , with ℐ = ℐ ∪ ℐ and ℐ ∩ ℐ ∕ = ∅. We assume that an attacker may know a subset 3 of items of a transaction , ⊂ , which may include non-sensitive (in ℐ ) as well as sensitive items (in ℐ ). Our objective is to prevent such an attacker from inferring, with high certainty, that a transaction containing ⊂ also contains a sensitive item / ∈ . Such an inference corresponds to 1 Currently banned from the Guantánamo Bay prison camp library. 2 In case of individual preferences about what is sensitive, as in [29] , we combine all such preferences to a global list of sensitive items, and treat items that are non-sensitive for all users separately. 3 An attacker may conceivably know all items in a transaction ; in this case the problem we address has no object.
mining [2] association rule → . In such an association rule, the left side is the antecedent, and the right side the consequent. A rule whose consequent involves at least one sensitive item ∈ ℐ is a sensitive association rule (SAR). We need to bring the data in a form that prevents the mining of high-confidence SARs. To prevent such inferences, we would like the data to be rendered in a form that keeps the confidence of each SAR lower than a threshold . Thus, we arrive at the following definition. DEFINITION 3.1. A transaction data set , drawing items from ℐ, is said to satisfy -uncertainty, if and only if, for any transaction ∈ , any subset of items ⊂ , ⊂ ℐ, and any sensitive item / ∈ , ∈ ℐ , the confidence of the Sensitive Association Rule (SAR) → is less than a value > 0.
The privacy concept in Definition 3.1 does not limit the provenance of the items that make up to ℐ . Sensitive items from ℐ may also form part of adversaries' prior knowledge. It poses no bound on an association rule's support either. All sensitive associations of high confidence need to be blocked, even if they involve a single transaction; on the other hand, innocuous appearances of sensitive items that imply no high-confidence associations are allowed. For example, assume that, out of 1000 transactions containing milk, one also contains hemorrhoid cream. By -uncertainty, this transaction can be published, since no confident SAR is established thereby, hence nobody's privacy is compromised. On the other hand, assume that the SAR "those who buy blue cheese also buy strawberry-flavored condoms" can be mined from a few transactions. Then the data should be transformed so that this rule shall not be minable. These observations come in contrast to the view of privacy in perturbation-based models [4] . We solve the natural problem of rendering a given transaction data set -uncertain: PROBLEM 1. Given a transaction data set , drawing items from ℐ, including a subset of sensitive items ℐ ⊂ ℐ, transform to an anonymized form ′ that satisfies -uncertainty, maintaining the integrity of the data and as much of their utility as possible.
This problem is inherently adopted to the privacy threat transaction data are exposed to, and one of the data mining tasks they are likely to be used for. [23, 14] also assume inference by association to be the risk the data are subject to, yet do not explicitly design their models for it. Instead, they adopt precepts ofanonymization, which divides the data into homogeneous groups. [12, 30] have an inference threat in mind, yet also divide transactions into groups, and assume adversaries only have access to items in ℐ , as if the data were relational data with one or more unknown sensitive attributes. We discard such precepts of relational anonymization. Table 2 gathers together our notations.
The support, ( ), of a given a subset of items is the number of transactions ∈ such that ⊂ [2] . We represent the union of two item sets (itemsets) or singleton items, 1 and 2, as 1 2. The confidence of a SAR → is
. To attain -uncertainty, we need to ensure that the confidence of each SAR is lower than . The following lemma shows that we only need to consider association rules with a singleton consequent. LEMMA 3.1. If an association rule → , where is a single item, has confidence ( → ) < , then any rule → with ∈ also has a confidence less than .
PROOF. Every transaction that contains also contains .
Thus, the confidence of rule → is less than .
Notation Meaning ℐ
The domain of items ℐ
The set of sensitive items in ℐ
The non-sensitive items in ; ℐ ∪ ℐ = ℐ ℋ
The hierarchy of non-sensitive items in ℐ A set of transactions
′
The anonymized form of ( )
The number of transactions in that contain item 
Information Loss Metric
A utility metric should indicate the expected performance in a task. We adapt the information loss metric used in [15, 23, 14] . This metric measures the fitness of the anonymized data for a variety of data mining tasks, including classification, analytical processing, and rule mining. We emphasize that the nature of this metric reflects an established consensus that antecedent research on anonymization using generalization and suppression has arrived at [12, 11, 30, 23, 14] , which we follow. It would also be desirable to compare the association rules mined from anonymized data to those mined from the original data. Still, there is no straightforward way of doing so. The anonymized data can be used to mine generalized association rules [22] . Such rules are correct; they can be mined from the original data too; there is no error in them. After all, mining generalized association rules is a valid and self-contained data mining application in itself [22] . These rules are characterized by less specificity, as they view the data from a higher (but not less interesting) point, blurring details. The degree to which a generalized association rule correctly reflects more particular associations depends on the nature of the underlying data. Still, generalized rules can offer bounds on the confidence of the more particular rules they may represent. An exploration of this question would open a separate and worthwhile research question, following the footsteps of [22] . Here it is safe to claim that the more generalization or suppression we perform, the less specific rules we will derive. Our metric measures this indistinctness in the anonymized data. As we discuss in Appendix B, we employ a generalization hierarchy for items in ℐ . A leaf node therein represents a non-sensitive item. An internal node is a generalized value of its descendants; the root stands for the generalized value of all items. Figure 1 shows an example. Items beer, wine, fish, and beef are non-sensitive. The former two can be generalized to alcohol, and the latter two to meat. alcohol and meat can be further generalized to ALL.
Let ℋ be a hierarchy of non-sensitive items, and a node in it. We define the information loss of as follows:
|ℐ | where leaves( ) is the set of leaves under the subtree rooted at in ℋ. If is a leaf, then leaves( ) = ∅. For the hierarchy in Figure  1 , the information loss of node alcohol is
. Given an item , the information loss it involves is defined as:
if is suppressed For example, if beer is generalized to alcohol, it incurs information loss infoLoss(beer) = ℐℒalcohol = . As we will discuss in Sections 4 and 5, we opt for global suppression and generalization. That is, a suppressed item is deleted from all transactions containing it, and a generalized one is substituted by the same hierarchy node in all transactions where it appears. These choices ensure that no false inferences are drawn from the anonymized data.
For any item , let ( ) be the number of transactions in a transaction data set that contain , before anonymization. Then the average information loss of an anonymized form ′ of is:
Assume there are three transactions as follows:
{wine, fish, pregnancy test, viagra} {wine, beef} {beer} Assume a hierarchy (for non-sensitive items) as in Figure 1 . If we generalize fish and beef to meat and suppress viagra, then avgLoss
.
SUPPRESSION METHOD
We now examine how value suppression can be applied to control the confidence of sensitive association rules (SARs). We start out by discussing what type of suppression is appropriate here.
Given a transactional dataset and an item participating in its transactions, can be partially suppressed, i.e., deleted from only a subset of transactions in that contain it. However, such partial suppression may have undesired side-effects, such as the generation of false association rules [24] . As [27] has shown, an attempt to prevent such effects limits our capacity to hide all sensitive rules. To avoid such repercussions, we opt for global suppression: a suppressed item is deleted from all transactions in that contain it. Global suppression does not generate false rules, and does not perturb the confidence of rules other than those we intend to conceal.
Suppression can be applied on both sensitive and non-sensitive items. This flexibility comes in contrast to the usual assumptions about anonymizing microdata, where there is exactly one sensitive attribute whose values are not supposed to be suppressed [17] . Here, it may be advisable to suppress one sensitive item in order to decrease one's confidence for inferring the existence of another.
Our goal is to suppress a set of items ⊂ ℐ so that the confidence of all minable SARs is kept lower than , while avgLoss( ) is minimized. This is a combinatorial optimization problem. We could try all subsets ⊂ ℐ, check which ones yield a -uncertain data set ′ when suppressed, and select the one of them that achieves the lowest information loss; that would be the optimal solution. However, checking all subsets of ℐ yields ( 2 |ℐ| ) complexity. Given the hardness of the problem, we direct our efforts towards an effective heuristic. We opt for an iterative greedy heuristic. In a nutshell, it conceals SARs in iterations of increasing antecedent cardinality. In the th iteration, it considers all derivable SARs with antecedents of exactly items, computes their confidences, and suppresses items so as to blanket those that violate -uncertainty. Suppressions conducted at lower save us from some confidence computations at higher ; we gain efficiency at the price of optimality. The process terminates after checking the longest minable SARs.
Let ℛ be the set of SARs that violate -uncertainty, hence have to be concealed, in the th iteration. Given an item , either sensitive or non-sensitive, let ( , ℛ ) be the number of rules in ℛ that contain it (either in their antecedents or in their consequents), and ( ) the number of transactions in that contain it. We define the payoff ratio of item with respect to ℛ as
. This ratio expresses the amount of SARs concealed per unit of lost information when we suppress , hence quantifies the suppression's payoff. Higher payoff is preferable.
Our heuristic first computes the payoff ratios of all items involved therein. Then, it progressively suppresses the next item of highest payoff ratio. After suppressing an item , it deletes from ℛ all SARs that contain it. This process terminates when ℛ becomes empty; then we move to ℛ +1. The pseudo-code of this SuppressControl algorithm is found in Section A.1. To calculate the confidence of SAR → , we have to compute the support of itemsets and . We represent our transaction data set in vertical format, where each item is followed by its transaction cover, i.e., the list of transactions containing it [20, 32] . This format allows us to compute the support of an itemset by intersecting the transaction covers of any two subsets , ⊆ , such that ∪ = . Figure 2(a) illustrates the vertical format of Table 1 . To facilitate SAR generation and antecedents support counting, we employ two tries [5, 6] . The Sensitive Rules Trie (SRT) has nodes associated to SARs, conceptualized as -itemsets, including the sensitive item in an SAR's consequent and − 1 items in its antecedent. The root corresponds to an empty itemset. Nodes attached to the root represent an SAR's sensitive consequent. Each subsequent node stores the last item in the antecedent of the SAR it stands for. A full SAR is reconstructed by following a path through the SRT. A node's siblings represent SARs that differ only at one antecedent item. A join of sibling nodes generates an SAR of antecedent larger by one item. Figure 3 shows a trie for all SARs derived from Table 1 with antecedent size 1, and one with antecedent size 2, namely 1 1 → ; the latter is produced by joining sibling nodes 1 (representing 1 → ) and 1 (representing 1 → ), and stored by appending a node of item 1 as a child of node 1; its transaction cover is an intersection of those of 1 and 1.
Similarly, the Antecedents Trie (AT) is used to generate candidate itemsets that serve as SAR antecedents. Now each node represents an antecedent itemset, and is labeled by the last item in the itemset it represents. A full itemset is reconstructed by following a path through the AT. Nodes at lower levels represent itemsets of higher cardinality. As with the SRT, larger antecedent itemsets are generated from existing ones by joining sibling nodes. Each node stores the transaction cover of the itemset it stands for. Thus, again, an intersection operation suffices to calculate the cover of a larger itemset and its support. Figure 4 illustrates an example of AT node generation and support computation for the data set in Table 1 . The full AT is too large to show here, as it has 37 nodes over 5 levels. Our algorithm uses these structures to identify SARs whose confidence exceeds , expanding them by one level per iteration. To facilitate this operation, we use a structure akin to the Frequent Pattern tree [13] , the Payoff Tree (PT). A path in a PT represents an SAR to be concealed. Now the sensitive consequent is represented by the leaf node where the path ends, and its ancestors stand for the antecedent. For each item, a header table records the number of SARs and transactions in which this item is involved. This information aids the calculation of payoff ratios. The worst-case complexity of these structures is (
, where is the maximum transaction length in . In practice, it is pruned by suppressions performed before high itemset cardinalities are reached, as in [31] . Section A.1 illustrates our method with an example.
GENERALIZATION METHOD
In this section we examine how value generalization can be applied to our problem. Like suppression, generalization comes in two variants: local and global. In local generalization [14] , different instances of the same item may be generalized to different levels in a generalization hierarchy ℋ. However, as the case is with partial suppression, local generalization has unwelcome side-effects. It allows for inconsistencies in our generalization choices, from which privacy-threatening inferences can be made by an adversary, as in [26] . Besides, the extra precision it allows for does not translate to more precise association rule mining. When mining association rules from a locally generalized data set, no precise confidences can be calculated for rules involving locally generalized items, but only upper and lower bounds thereof; thereby, the estimated confidence of certain association may be inadvertently increasing, leading to the mining of false positive rules. On the other hand, global generalization [23] maps all instances of an item , as well as all items of the same subtree of hierarchy ℋ, to the same level in ℋ. For example, using the hierarchy in Figure 1 , if an instance of beer is generalized to alcohol, then all other instances of beer, as well as all instances of wine, are consistently generalized in the same manner. Even if only an instance of beer were generalized to alcohol, one would not be able to mine exact inferences involving beer and wine; only inferences at the generalization level of alcohol would be unambiguous. This state of affairs is the same with global generalization; local generalization does not offer a significant mining advantage. In conclusion, we opt for global generalization.
A further question is whether we should apply generalization on both sensitive and non-sensitive items, as we do with suppression in Section 4. We opt for generalizing only non-sensitive items. Appendix B presents our detailed argument. Its core is that a sensitive item should never be generalized at an intermediate hierarchy level; if it were, then that choice itself would reveal sensitive information. Again, this argument is reminiscent of the minimality attack argument made by [26] in the context of microdata anonymization.
In effect, we develop an algorithm that anonymizes by applying global generalization over the hierarchy ℋ of non-sensitive items in ℐ , along with selective global suppression of some items. In a nutshell, our algorithm performs a top-down particularization process. It starts out assuming that all items in are generalized at the top level of ℋ, represented by the root node. This state of affairs satisfies -uncertainty, but provides no information at all. In order to recover some information, we relax, or particularize, the generalization by moving along branches of ℋ in a greedy manner. A particularization is a move from (i.e., split of) a node in ℋ to its children, which allows all items in that belong to leaves of to assume the more particular values in those children. For example, in the hierarchy of Figure 1 , splitting node ALL to its children nodes alcohol and meat allows all instances of fish and beef (beer and wine) in our data to assume the value meat (alcohol) instead of ALL. A particularization move aims to gain as much information as possible. However, a particularization per se may uncover item values in a way that violates -uncertainty. In a such a case, our algorithm examines whether the violation of -uncertainty can be avoided by suppressing some items, and calculates the net information gain of the combined particularization-and-suppression move. At each step, the algorithm opts for the move of maximum net information gain. We now present the tools this algorithm employs.
The Particularization Tree
We represent particularizations (i.e., from a bottom-up view, generalizations) using a particularization tree . A node of maps a node of ℋ, which represents a set of items ( ), as follows:
The leaves of (which may be internal nodes of ℋ) show the level of generalization to which all instances of items beneath them in ℋ are generalized. A leaf node ℓ ∈ that maps a leaf node in ℋ indicates that the related item is not generalized at all. A leaf node ℓ in that maps an internal node in ℋ prescribes that any item ∈ (ℓ) that appears in any transaction ∈ is generalized to ℓ. This generalization at ℓ, applied on , yields information loss:
Coming back to the example using the hierarchy ℋ in Figure 1 , a particularization tree built over ℋ initially consists of the root node . The split of this node, provided it incurs positive information gain, adds alcohol and meat as leaves in . Next, assume that splitting alcohol brings about positive net information gain, but splitting meat does not. Then alcohol is split into beer and wine. Eventually, contains three leaf nodes, beer, wine, and meat, denoting the adopted generalization rules (GRs). According to these GRs, all instances of fish and beef in are mapped to meat. More details on this algorithm are discussed in Section 5.3.
Potential Net Information Gain
As we discussed, our algorithm aims to achieve as much net information gain as it can at each step. When faced with more than one option, it greedily carries out the move that offers the greatest information gain benefit. Information gain is negative information loss. When particularization is combined with suppression, we calculate their net effect on data utility. Negative information gain (i.e., positive information loss) can also arise from a move.
To faciliate the greedy choice of one among the leaf nodes of that are candidate for splitting, we define the Potential Net Information Gain (PNIG) a node's split will effect, if carried out:
This function calculates the information that would be gained by splitting a leaf node in as the difference of the information loss by generalization involving before the split (first term) from that after the split (second term), minus the loss of information caused by item suppressions required to maintain -uncertainty (third term). A need for such suppressions can arise from SARs violating -uncertainty, whose antecedents contain the newly particularized children of . In order to find items that would have to be suppressed to maintain -uncertainty, we use a variant of suppressControl that duly selects items for suppression, but does not suppress them; it only returns the third term in Equation 2.
Still, in order to properly calculate the loss incurred by suppressions of generalized items, we have to enhance the definition of payoff ratio. The information loss incurred by suppressing a generalized item is not simply equal to the number of transactions where it is found; it is only the difference between the loss of a wholesale suppression and that already incurred by generalization to . Suppressing amounts to suppressing all items in already mapped to . The number of such items is ( ) = ∑ ∈ ( ) ( ). The information lost by this mapping is ( ) ⋅ ℐℒ , hence the information surviving after it is ( )⋅(1−ℐℒ ). Therefore, we redefine the payoff ratio as
, where ℛ is the set of SARs we try to conceal and ( , ℛ) the number of rules in ℛ that contain . Our suppression mechanism again selects the item of highest payoff ratio. The pseudo-code for our PNIG calculation procedure infoGain is found in Section A.2.
The Algorithm
We now give more details on our top-down global generalization algorithm, TDControl. As we discussed, it constructs a particularization tree in a greedy manner, aiming to achieve the highest information gain possible in each move. It terminates when no move of positive net information gain is possible any more; i.e., when any possible particularization move would violate -uncertainty, and the suppressions required to safeguard it would cause more loss of information than the gain the particularization offers in the first place. In such circumstances, Equation 2 would acquire negative values for all candidate nodes. These leaf nodes in the final particularization tree define the final GRs applied to anonymize .
In more detail, is initialized as the root of ℋ, which holds all items in ℐ . Then, at each iteration, we calculate the PNIG of all leaf nodes of , and split the node ℓ of highest PNIG. This split adds to the children of ℓ, as found in ℋ, which become leaf nodes in themselves, and hence candidates for splitting in the next iteration. Section A.2 provides the pseudo-code of this TDControl algorithm and a full example of its operation.
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Now we evaluate the effectiveness of our algorithms. We clarify that SuppressControl is a stand-alone scheme that achievesuncertainty by suppression. TDControl obtains -uncertainty by both generalization and suppression, while it uses SuppressControl as a component. Our schemes are not comparable to previous works in transaction anonymization, because such works do not provide -uncertainty guarantees. Thus, we compare against a baseline -uncertainty-attaining method, denoted as Simple, which suppresses all sensitive items and preserves others without generalization. Qualitatively, this suppression incurs a distinctive damage, as it disables all mining related to sensitive items. The desired outcome is to enable such mining to the extent allowed by -uncertainty. Our methods are designed with this goal in mind. We assess performance in terms of runtime and the information loss incurred to achieve -uncertainty. Algorithms were implemented in C++ and ran on an Intel Core 2 Duo 2.33GHz machine with 4GB RAM running Windows XP. We used benchmark data that are popular in related research [23, 14] , described in Appendix C. As no distinction of sensitive from non-sensitive items is provided in the data, we randomly select sensitive items, tuning their percentage; its default value is 40%. Given the set of non-sensitive items ℐ , a fan-out parameter determines the shape of hierarchy ℋ. Our default fan-out is 4. The problem posed by -uncertainty becomes computationally harder as the maximum transaction length increases. Even so, our best method can process 99% of the largest test dataset. We also conduct detailed experiments on transactions of at most 5 items. Last, our default value of is 0.5.
Varying dataset. We first run all algorithms with default parameters on all datasets. Figure 5 illustrates the results. WV1 stands for BMS-WebView-1, WV2 for BMS-WebView-2, and POS for BMS-POS. SuppressControl performs poorly in both information quality and time. Checking the anonymized datasets it produces, we find that SuppressControl suppresses almost all the sensitive items, and it also suppresses a few non-sensitive items. For instance, SuppressControl suppresses 90% of sensitive items in WV1, as well as 60% of non-sensitive ones, but TDControl suppresses 80% percent of sensitive items only. Thus, the output of SuppressControl is worse than Simple, even as it tries to minimize information loss at each iteration. SuppressControl performs worse than TDControl in terms of efficiency too, as the former needs to consider all SARs in the whole dataset at each iteration, while the latter only processes SARs restricted to a subset of items. Varying datasets In the following experiments we use the BMS-POS dataset. Results with the other two datasets exhibit similar trends. Furthermore, BMS-POS is much larger than the others. Thus, we consider BMS-POS as a better ground for testing the strengths and weaknesses of the algorithms we compare.
Processing transactions of increasing length. In our previous experiments we have set the maximum length at 5. This setting allows us to illustrate the practical feasibility of our strong privacy objective with real-world data of reasonable transaction length, for which our techniques are most suitable. This choice has processed 306, 983 out of 515, 597 transactions in BMS-POS, thus excluded 40.5% of the transactions, which have length more than 5. It is interesting to examine to what extent our -uncertainty algorithms can operate on data of unbounded transaction length. To this end, we have experimented as follows. We sorted the transaction in BMS-POS by length in ascending order, and processed prefixes of this ordered dataset, using the default settings of = 0.5, fan-out 4, and the percentage of sensitive items at 40%. Figure 6 shows the results as a function of the size of the dataset prefix involved. Given the sorted order, larger size involves not only more transactions, but also increasingly longer transactions. The maximum transaction lengths for the six prefixes in the experiment are 2, 3, 5, 9, 23, and 77, respectively. SuppressControl can process up to 400, 000 tuples before running out of memory. However, our method of choice, TDControl, can satisfactorily process up to 515, 500 tuples (i.e., 99% percent of data in BMS-POS), involving all transactions of length no more than 77, i.e., allowing an adversary's knowledge of up to 76 items in a transaction, and maintains its information loss advantage with respect to Simple. This result confirms that -uncertainty is a feasible privacy objective even for data sets containing very long transactions and a high percentage of sensitive items. Previous works dealing with sensitive item disclosure do not experiment with such settings, even while they define the problem in a less general manner. [30] assumes as a default setting that an adversary may know only up to = 4, only nonsensitive, items in a transaction; [12] assumes as a default setting that there are only 10 sensitive items in the data and also postulates that an adversary can only know about non-sensitive items. Simple is the fastest algorithm in this experiment, but its information loss does not present a clear pattern, as sensitive items are randomly selected. The amount of SARs to conceal grows as a function of the maximum transaction length, which increases as the prefix is enlarged. Thus, it is increasingly harder to reduce the confidence of SARs lower than . Therefore, the information loss of TDControl and SuppressControl grows with prefix size. Last, the runtime of all three algorithms grows with the prefix size as expected. Varying the value of Tuning . Next, we use the prefix with 300, 000 tuples as the experiment dataset, denoted as POS 30 . We randomly mark 40% percent of the items in POS 30 as sensitive, denoted as ℐ 30 40, and vary . Figure 7 shows our results. As expected, the information loss of both TDControl and SuppressControl decreases as a function of . This is due to the fact that higher requires less SARs to be concealed. However, as grows, the amount of suppressed sensitive items decreases, therefore more SARs need to be checked at each step. In effect, runtime grows with . As in previous experiments, TDControl achieves the best information quality, while its time efficiency stands between those of Simple and SuppressControl. The performance of Simple is not affected by . Tuning fan-out. Figure 8 presents our results as a function of the fan-out value in the hierarchy ℋ, using dataset POS 30 and the set of sensitive items ℐ 30 40. This parameter only affects the performance of TDControl, yet the information quality achieved by TDControl does not change uniformly as a function of fanout. Still, overall the curve suggests that a smaller value of fanout tends to preserve more information. After all, when the fan-out is higher, then more nodes are generalized to a single node in one step, hence the likelihood of over-generalization is increased. On the other hand, for lower fan-out the hierarchy ℋ is deeper, hence the number of possible intermediate generalization levels for each leaf node is increased, and it becomes more likely that an item is generalized to a level where more information is preserved. For similar reasons, runtime tends to drop for higher fan-out. Tuning percentage of sensitive items. We now tune the percentage of items selected as sensitive with POS 30 . Six sets of sensitive items are generated. For consistency, we ensure that the set of sensitive items for a smaller percentage is a subset of that for larger. Figure 9 shows the results. The number of minable SARs that have to be concealed grows with . In effect, the time required to calculate the confidences of such SARs increases, hence information loss and runtime grow. TDControl is again the clear winner in terms of information preserved with a satisfactory runtime. Tuning |ℐ|. Using POS 30 , we prepared datasets of different numbers of distinct items. Let ℐ 30 be the item domain of POS 30 . We randomly selected subsets of items ℐ ′ from ℐ 30 , and generated a dataset by removing from POS 30 all items not appearing in ℐ ′ . For each generated dataset we randomly select its set of sensitive items, ensuring that smaller sets of selected items (sensitive items) are subsets of larger ones. Figure 10 shows our results. Runtime grows with |ℐ ′ |, as growing ℐ ′ implies more data and more SARs to handle. The information loss curve of Simple is unstable, as the number of instances of each suppressed item varies. However, since the amount of SARs to conceal grows as a function of |ℐ ′ |, the information loss of TDControl and SuppressControl grows with it as well. TDControl clearly outperforms the other two methods in information quality in this experiment too.
A comparison to 1-to-2 privacy. We introduce a new privacy model, -uncertainty, and deterministic, generalization-based algorithms to achieve it. Still, the same privacy guarantee can in principle be provided, in expectation, by probabilistic perturbationbased models. While the work needed in this area goes beyond the scope of this paper, we can safely say that a starting point for a perturbation-based scheme that achieves -uncertainty in expectation would be the mechanism of 1-to-2 privacy [9, 4] , which aims to hide the exact contents of transactions. Therefore, we conduct a basic comparison to this technique in terms of information loss. We adopt a basic version of 1-to-2 privacy, using a simple form of its select-a-size randomization operator; more sophisticated variants may achieve higher privacy (which we do not measure) at the price of more information loss (which we measure). This operator [9] features two parameters: a randomization level, 0 ≤ ≤ 1 that determines the amount of new items added in a transaction, and a transaction subset size selection probability distribution, { [ ]} | | =0 [10, 9] . For each transaction , an integer 0 ≤ ≤ | | is selected with probability [ ], and randomly chosen items from are kept in its perturbed version, ′ . Then, each item / ∈ is added to ′ with probability . We assume a "default" probability distribution,
, as each item in is kept with probability 1− . We measure the information loss incurred by each noisy item in ∖ ′ as ℐℒ , where is the lowest common ancestor of all items in ( ′ ∖ )∪( ∖ ′ ), i.e. items added in, and missing from, ′ , in a hierarchy ℋ ′ containing all items; when sensitive items are removed from ℋ ′ , we get the hierarchy used by TDControl. We first set = = 0.5 and study the effect of dataset size with prefixes of BMS-POS sorted by length. Figure 11(a) shows the average information loss results. The loss of select-a-size roughly depends on the amount of items kept, while that of TDControl is less for smaller data size and converges robustly to a value lower than that of select-a-size as the size grows. This result indicates that our deterministic generalization framework can effectively contain the amount of information sacrificed to achieve -uncertainty in a way competitive to randomization. Then we process transactions of size at most 5, and study the effect of , setting = 1− . This setting forms a baseline for a perturbation scheme aiming at -uncertainty. Figure 11(b) shows our results. Higher allows for more items to be preserved, hence better accuracy. TDControl achieves higher information accuracy for practically significant values of .
CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduced -uncertainty, the first, to our knowledge, anonymization model that naturally safeguards against mining sensitive inferences, without imposing constraints on an adversary's prior knowledge, and without falsifying data. Despite, or because of, its naturalness, the model poses a non-trivial problem. Rendering a transaction data set -uncertain in a way better than suppressing all sensitive items is a challenging task. We apply sophisticated techniques on this problem, with an algorithm that couples global generalization over non-sensitive items with selective global suppression of some items, without relying on precepts of relational anonymization. We show that this algorithm consistently leads to anonymizations of higher quality than the naive approach, and favorable results compared to a baseline perturbation-based scheme. Appendix D discusses questions peripheral to our work.
APPENDIX A. PSEUDO-CODES AND EXAMPLES

A.1 Suppression Method
Algorithm 1 presents our suppression algorithm SuppressControl, operating on a transactional dataset .
Algorithm 1: SuppressControl( )
Find the item of maximum payoff( , ); 9
Suppress ; 10 Delete all rules in ℛ containing ; 11 = + ( ); 12 = + 1; 13 Return ; 14
The algorithm operates iteratively with increasing . In the th round, it finds the set ℛ ′ of all SARs whose antecedents contain exactly items. It then extracts from ℛ ′ the set of those SARs that have confidence at least (Lines 4-7). Then it goes about concealing the SARs in ℛ by suppressing the highest-payoff item until ℛ becomes empty (Lines [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . For that purpose, we maintain a priority queue of item payoffs. For each item, we keep a bag of rules that contain it, and for each rule the items in it. After each item suppression, we update accordingly the payoff ratios of items affected by the rule's deletion, and the queue. The cost of Step 9 is logarithmic on the number of items. The algorithm terminates when there is no SAR with an antecedent of items, hence neither one for larger values of (Lines 5-6).
An example of our suppression strategy is shown below.
EXAMPLE A.1. We wish to render the transaction data set in Table 1 in a -uncertain form with = 0.7. Assume that and are sensitive items, while all the remaining ones are non-sensitive. The tree in Figure 12 depicts the generated SRT for all the SARs processed in the first round of the algorithm, for = 1. Each path in the tree starts out with the sensitive consequent of the rule it forms, and continues with the nodes of all antecedent items. In order to calculate the confidences of the SARs in the SRT of Figure 12 , we also maintain an AT containing all possible SAR antecedents, as in Figure 13 . Using the information contained in these two trees, we calculate the confidence of all SARs for | | = 1, and find the set of SARs whose confidence violates the threshold = 0.7, namely ℛ1 = { → , 1 → , 1 → }. We need to conceal the rules in ℛ1.
Header table   item Head of node-link α In order to carry out this concealment operation, we first construct the payoff tree and the associated header table for these SARs, as illustrated in Figure 14 . The header table records the number of SARs and transactions in which each item is involved. The payoff tree paths represent the three SARs to be concealed. The values beside each node label in this payoff tree denote the number of paths (i.e., SARs) in the tree that pass through that node. For example, the node label 1 : 2 indicates that there are two paths passing through the node of item 1, hence two SARs involving that item. Moreover, all nodes with the same item-label are linked by dashed lines in the figure. Following these links, we can calculate the aggregate number of SARs involving a certain item in the header table. Thus, using the transaction number information in the header table, we calculate, for example, that the payoff ratio for item 1 is . This payoff ratio is the highest among the three items in our payoff tree. Thus, our algorithm first suppresses 1. After suppressing 1, the SAR counters for the remaining two items are updated accordingly. In particular, the SAR counter of becomes 1, since the SAR 1 → has been now concealed and only → remains. Likewise, the SAR counter of also assumes the value 1, as 1 → has been suppressed and only → remains. In fact, a single SAR involves both of these two remaining items. The highest payoff ratio is now achieved by , hence we suppress it. Thus, we have now concealed all rules in ℛ1.
After we have suppressed 1 and , the only SAR with = 2 items in its antecedent that we can derive in the second round is 2 1 → with transaction cover [1, 2, 5] and
< . Since this confidence does not violate our threshold , no SAR needs to be hidden. Eventually, in the third round, we find there is no SAR with 3 items in its antecedent, hence the suppression operation ends. Table 3 shows the resulting published -uncertain dataset. 
TID Transactions
A.2 Generalization Method
Function 2 shows our PNIG calculation procedure infoGain. It calculates the effect of splitting node , receiving three input parameters: ℒ, the set of leaf nodes in the particularization tree; ∈ ℒ, the leaf node to be split; and ℋ, the hierarchy over nonsensitive items. It is assumed that the anonymized dataset generated by applying on the generalization rules defined by ℒ does not give rise to SARs violating the threshold; by induction, the result of the algorithm will satisfy -uncertainty too. The information that would be gained if we split is calculated as the difference of the information loss before the split from that after the split (Lines 3-5). The splitting of would transform ℒ to ℒ , in which is replaced by its children (Lines 6-9).
Copy ℒ to a local variable ℒ ; 6
Remove from ℒ ; 7 foreach child of in ℋ do 8
Add to ℒ ; 9 = Particularize(trans( ), ℒ ); 10 loss = suppressTest( ); 11 = set of items selected by suppressTest; 12 pnig( ) = gain − loss; 13
Return pnig( ); 14 Still, the particularization carried out to gain information may allow the derivation of SARs that violate the confidence threshold . In order to preserve -uncertainty, we should perform some suppression in combination with particularization. A violation of -uncertainty caused by splitting can only arise from sensitive association rules whose antecedents contain the newly particularized children of . Thus, in order to hide SARs that violate the threshold after splitting , we only need to process transactions that contain children of . To facilitate this task, we need to know the set trans( ) of transactions containing items in ( ); we discuss how we do this in the overall algorithm later. Then, all transactions in trans( ) are particularized (i.e., the children of in them are mapped to more specific generalization levels) according to the (now relaxed) generalization rules defined by ℒ (Line 10). Then we find those items that would need to be suppressed in the ensuing data set so as to maintain -uncertainty. For this purpose we use Function suppressTest, a variant of suppressControl that selects items for suppression, but does not actually suppress them (Line 11). We store the set of items that would have to be suppressed (Line 12), so that we can retrieve them if we actually opt for splitting and incurring the calculated PNIG. Besides, this suppression, if opted for by the algorithm, would cause information loss, which is deducted from gain (Line 13).
trans( ), hence gain = 2.5. However, the sensitive rule 1 → will then have confidence 1. Therefore, we need to suppress 1, and the real PNIG is pnig( ) = gain − loss = 2.5 − 1 = 1.5. On the other hand, the PNIG for splitting is 3, thus we opt for splitting first, and get ℒ = { 1, 2, }. Finally, we also split , while suppressing 1, hence ℒ = { 1, 2, 2}. We do not include 1 in ℒ, since it has been globally suppressed. Applying the generalization implied by ℒ on Table 1 , we eventually get ′ = { 1 2 , 1 2 2, 2 2, 2 , 1 2 }. This result is by coincidence the same as that of Table 3 . This Section discusses our generalization choices. We assume an adversary who has knowledge of the published data, as well as the generalization hierarchy that we employ. Such knowledge needs to be made public, in order for the published form of the data to retain its usefulness.
We first discuss whether we should adopt a generalization hierarchy that combines sensitive and non-sensitive items (i.e., ℐ and ℐ ). A straightforward application of global generalization would suggest generalizing all items in ℐ so as to achieve low confidences for sensitive rules, assuming that a generalization hierarchy defines mixed categories containing sensitive along with non-sensitive items. Still, we should examine the ramifications of such an approach. We start our study with the following lemma.
LEMMA B.1. Let be a transactional data set, and ℋ ′ be a generalization hierarchy over its domain ℐ, including both sensitive and non-sensitive items. If an item , either sensitive or nonsensitive, is generalized to one of its ancestors in ℋ ′ , Γ, then, for any itemset ,
PROOF. Let ∈ be a transaction that contains ⊆ . Assume is transformed to¯ when is generalized to Γ. Then Γ ⊆ . Thus, any transaction containing prior to generalization, contains Γ after it. Then ( Γ) ≥ ( ), from which it follows that
Lemma B.1 appears superficially similar to Lemma 3.1, but they are quite different. Lemma 3.1, deals with rule → , where is a combination of items. Thus, for a transaction to contain , it should contain each of the items combined in ; this requirement is expressed as a conjunction. On the other hand, in Lemma B.1, we deal with rule → Γ, where Γ is a generalization. Thus, for a transaction to contain Γ, it should contain any of the items generalized to Γ; this requirement is expressed as a disjunction.
We proceed to examine the consequences of generalization applied on mixed hierarchies of sensitive and non-sensitive items in ℐ. Let be a transaction data set over ℐ with a mixed generalization hierarchy ℋ ′ . Assume an item ∈ ℐ and sensitive item ∈ ℐ , such that the SAR → has ( → ) ≥ . Then, we should decrease the confidence of this rule by generalization. Suppose that we generalize (and its siblings) to an ancestor Γ in ℋ ′ , ∈ (Γ), so that the confidence of the rule Γ → becomes less than . This reduction of confidence can be effectively achieved, because now (Γ) is counted over all items generalized to Γ along with .
However, an attempt to decrease the confidence of a certain SAR via generalization may inadvertently blur the confidence of another SAR. Assume there exists a sensitive item among the leaves of Γ as well, ∈ (Γ). Then, after generalizing to node Γ, any SAR → is generalized to the rule → Γ. According to Lemma B.1, this generalized rule has higher or equal confidence in relation to its more specific form.
Nevertheless, a suspicious adversary would assume that we have generalized to Γ in order to conceal its sensitive nature, and assume the higher confidence of rule → Γ as an upper bound for the confidence of the hidden rule → . However, our intention is to allow interested parties who know the published form of the data and the generalization hierarchy that we employ to derive useful associations, while preventing them from inferring sensitive associations. Employing a hierarchy that mixes sensitive with non-sensitive items does not help our objectives. It complicates the problem without offering an advantage. EXAMPLE B.1. Assume the transaction data set of Table 1 , with the item hierarchy of Figure 15 , and = 0.65. Items and are sensitive. SAR 1 → has confidence 2 3 , higher than . If we generalize 1 to , then ( → ) = 3 5 < . However, this generalization blurs the confidence of another SAR, namely 2 → ; its confidence before generalization is 1 2 < , but after generalization it is inadvertently submerged by rule 2 → with a confidence of 1.
Still, one could argue that generalizing sensitive items to a hierarchy node deemed non-sensitive provides a handy method of protection. In fact, [25] suggests this approach as an anonymization method. However, this approach defeats its own purpose. Generalizing at a specific non-sensitive level directly reveals that there has been a need to do so, hence sensitivity is unveiled.
For example, assume we employ a hierarchy that generalizes Flu and AIDS to Virus. An adversary who knows we employ this hierarchy immediately assumes a high likelihood of AIDS in case we have adopted such a generalization. Our generalization may in fact be a side-effect of the need to generalize a non-sensitive sibling of the sensitive item. We would prefer this kind of side-effects to be avoided. After all, the problem at hand is to conceal sensitive pieces of information by limiting an attacker's ability to infer them by association. Concealing sensitivity by merely mapping a sensitive value to a non-sensitive ancestor in a generalization hierarchy is only a solution of last resort. As we will discuss, the form in which we employ such a solution of last resort is complete suppression, which does not leave any room for ambiguity.
From the preceding discussion we conclude that it is preferable to disengage the generalization hierarchy of non-sensitive items (ℐ ) from that of sensitive items (ℐ ). Thus, we employ generalization hierarchy ℋ consisting of non-sensitive items in ℐ only. Sensitive items in ℐ should be treated separately.
We now discuss whether we should apply separate generalization on ℐ itself. A generalization hierarchy over ℐ can be of two kinds: Either intermediate nodes are considered as sensitive, or as non-sensitive. Still, in both cases, the very generalization of a sensitive value at a higher level does not conceal its sensitivity from an adversary; it would always reveal the sensitivity we attempt to hide, defeating our purpose. This state of affairs is reminiscent of the minimality attack problem encountered in microdata anonymization [26] .
To effectively prevent this problem, we opt for generalization for ℐ only combined with selective global suppression. In this approach, a sensitive item may still appear in an SAR's antecedent, and it may be globally suppressed; but it will never be generalized to an intermediate level. An SAR in the anonymized data set ′ may then only appear in the form → , where may contain intact sensitive items and (possibly) generalized non-sensitive items, and is a non-generalized sensitive item. For example, assume that a data set over the ℐ hierarchy of Figure 1 contains the transaction {beer, beef, viagra}. If we generalize beer to alcohol, then a mined SAR can be alcohol → viagra. We have used 3 datasets: BMS-POS, BMS-WebView-1, and BMSWebView-2. All are introduced in [33] and are common benchmarks in the data mining community. The transactions in BMS-POS are several years worth of point-of-sale data, collected from a large electronics retailer. BMS-WebView-1 and BMS-WebView-2 are composed of the click-stream data generated in several months from two e-commerce web sites. Table 4 summarizes the characteristics of these data sets, where max | | and avg| | represent the maximum and average transaction size, respectively.
C. DESCRIPTION OF DATA
These data sets do not specify which items in them are sensitive. Thus, we randomly choose a subset of items from the item domain ℐ as sensitive items ℐ . We consider the remaining items to be nonsensitive, and build a hierarchy ℋ over them. We sort non-sensitive items in the ascending order of their IDs, and assign neighboring items to a common parent. The number of children per internal node is controlled by the fan-out of the hierarchy.
D. DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to propose generalization as a data anonymization technique aiming to conceal sensitive association rules. Previous works either used generalization in the context of differently defined objectives that do not protect against the disclosure of sensitive information [23, 14] , or defined their models differently and did not use generalization as a tool either [10, 8, 24, 12, 30, 12, 25] .
Still, a discussion of the effects of generalization as an anonymization technique in the context of the problem we examine is due. Figure 16 (a) shows 4 transactions, in which is a sensitive item. The confidences of three derivable SARs are presented in Figure  16 (b). Still, if we generalize items 1 and 2 to , then the only derivable sensitive rule → has a confidence of
